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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000552

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR IVO DAALDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2019  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [NATO](#) [MOPS](#) [MARR](#) [MCAP](#) [PARM](#) [PINS](#) [OVIP](#) [AF](#)  
RS, XG, BK, MW, GG, UP, KV, YI  
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S PARTICIPATION IN  
THE DECEMBER 3-4 NATO MINISTERIAL

Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) The following message for the Secretary is being  
transmitted in memo format:

BEGIN TEXT

November 27, 2009

MEMORANDUM

For: Secretary Clinton

From: Ivo Daalder

Subject: Your Participation in the NATO Foreign Ministerial

Madam Secretary:

This ministerial may be one of ) if not the ) most  
important of the President's first term. As you outlined in  
your Council on Foreign Relations speech last July, a  
revitalized NATO must provide us with strong and capable  
partners to address issues of common concern. This  
ministerial will be a critical test of whether NATO is a  
reliable partner in achieving our top foreign policy  
priorities, including Afghanistan, Missile Defense, and  
Russia. If we can forge a consensus around our positions on  
these critical issues, NATO will have demonstrated that it  
remains the place where we can count on strong partners to

address common threats through concerted actions.

#### AFGHANISTAN

I expect Allies to provide strong political support at the Ministerial for the President's decisions on Afghanistan. Everyone is working hard to ensure they will back that support with additional contributions of troops, trainers, and trust funds to NATO's ISAF operation, as well as additional development assistance and more civilian expertise.

The Secretary General has been doing his part, visiting capitals and calling key Allies to urge them to deliver concrete contributions. He has clearly stated that security in Afghanistan is a NATO ) not a U.S. ) responsibility. He has reminded Allies that they have pressed Washington for years to work constructively with them, consulting rather than informing, and that the Obama Administration has been doing just that. And he has argued that, in turn, Allies need to respond positively and concretely to our desire for support. His message has been direct: Europe now needs to step up and share the burden in Afghanistan or else lose America's confidence in NATO as a reliable partner.

You should press Allies hard on this point, stressing that the President's announced contribution to the NATO effort is substantial and that the U.S. now needs Allies to step up and do their part. The success of NATO's mission in Afghanistan

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is at a tipping point. You should encourage nations to show resolve by committing as much as they possibly can at NATO's December 7 ISAF force generation conference, making clear that we are looking for at least a brigade-equivalent of new troop commitments as well as many more trainers. You should also seek Allied agreement to use the February 4-5 NATO Defense Ministerial as a final pledging conference to fill any outstanding requirements.

You should be prepared for questions about U.S. proposals to improve civilian coordination in Afghanistan. Allies have made clear that any proposal that undermines UNAMA's role is "dead on arrival." Many Allies have also been skeptical of suggestions to dual-hat the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan as COMISAF's civilian equivalent. In addition to concerns that such an arrangement would undermine UNAMA, Allies note the damaging optic of "Americanizing" the NATO effort. Allies are realistic about UNAMA's limitations and the need to significantly improve civilian coordination. They are looking to you to propose a solution that strengthens civ-mil coordination for counterinsurgency while preserving UNAMA's role.

If Allies respond to our leadership by increasing their contributions to Afghanistan and agreeing on how to improve civilian coordination, NATO will have demonstrated its value as a partner in Afghanistan.

#### Missile Defense

Allies have welcomed the President's Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) to European missile defense, and we are gaining support for the four key points emphasized by Secretary Gates at the Bratislava Ministerial:

-- Welcoming the PAA as a valuable contribution to the Alliance's security;

-- Affirming missile defense for NATO territories and populations as an appropriate and viable mission for the Alliance;

-- Presenting the PAA as a U.S. national contribution in the event NATO pursues a territorial missile defense mission; and

-- Noting that a possible expanded role for the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program would be a key milestone toward developing territorial missile defense for the Alliance.

In addition, we have agreed to welcome the opportunity to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, a position many Allies support.

France, the UK, Spain, Slovakia, and Belgium are among those that have objected to affirming missile defense for NATO territories and populations to be "an appropriate and viable mission" for NATO, largely reflecting cost concerns. They do

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not want to sign up to language they believe would commit NATO common funding for an expensive program, especially given the ongoing international financial crisis.

You should be prepared to push back strongly on any such objections, stressing that, given today's new security challenges, missile defense of NATO territories and populations is the essence of Article 5 and thus an Alliance mission by definition. To question the appropriateness and viability of this mission is therefore to question the very core of the Alliance itself.

Russia  
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I am growing increasingly convinced that Russia is not serious about its engagement with NATO. Our reset policy assumes that Russia will reciprocate. While Moscow may be doing so bilaterally, it clearly is not doing so at NATO, whether by neglect or as a deliberate strategy. After months of negotiations, Moscow instructed its mission to suspend work on a "Way Forward" paper that would reform and restructure the NATO-Russia Council, making it a more effective institution. The suspension of negotiations has exasperated the Secretary General and all Allies, even those usually in favor of closer NATO-Russia relations. At the same time, Russia has continued to press its own agenda, including a potentially divisive joint assessment of threats. Allies are clear engagement has to be a two-way street; they have informally agreed to set aside the joint assessment until such time as Russia is prepared to reengage constructively on restructuring the NRC.

Despite NATO's positive outreach, Russia continues to use its presence at NATO to try to divide the Alliance. Russia's strong push for a European Security Treaty (EST) appears designed to undermine NATO. Moscow is also pressing hard to conduct EST discussions within the NATO-Russia Council in an apparent attempt to short-circuit the OSCE process, likely hoping to avoid discussion of Russia's adherence to the human rights dimensions of the OSCE's Helsinki Final Act. While we have resisted this forum shopping, we need a more well-defined policy on how to respond to Russia's call for an EST, including how to protect existing European security structures from being undermined by Moscow's zero-sum efforts to rewrite the security architecture and their international commitments.

You should use your intervention to begin forging a shared Allied assessment of what Moscow is up to in NATO, and then lay the basis for a common response to Russia's forthcoming attempt to renegotiate the fundamentals of the European security architecture. We must remain open to substantive cooperation with Moscow on issues of common concern (including Afghanistan, narcotics, piracy, terrorism and missile defense), but we should be clear that the existing European security framework (including a restructured NRC) is perfectly adequate for such substantive engagement. Forging an Allied consensus on these points will reaffirm the

importance and strength of NATO as our partner in engaging with Russia.

Strategic Concept and NATO Reform  
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I did not pick the three issues above randomly. They are at the heart of NATO's Strategic Concept exercise. If we get them right, we will be well on our way to developing a new statement of NATO's purpose and mission. Failure to agree on these core issues, however, will likely signal future difficulties in agreeing on a meaningful new Strategic Concept. How can NATO agree on strategy if, for example, it is unable to achieve a common understanding on Russia? I have worked closely with Madeleine Albright on these issues, and she is determined to address them forcefully in her final report on the new Concept.

Finally, serious reform of NATO's processes ) how the Alliance does business ) is absolutely essential to achieving our substantive objectives. We need a 21st century Alliance to face 21st century threats and challenges. You have made this point strongly to the Secretary General last September, and I have made it a top priority here in Brussels. There is plenty of resistance to changing the way the Alliance does business here, which is why I urge you to drive home the point that this Alliance must change the way it operates if it is to be a valuable partner in tackling the many complex issues that we all confront in this still-young century.

Madame Secretary, we at USNATO look forward to welcoming you to Brussels for what will undoubtedly be a critical ministerial meeting next week.

END TEXT  
DAALDER